Tag Archives: OSINT

People Search Sites – Erase Me Please

The good folks over at Divine Intel (Twitter @divineintel) asked to borrow a little space on my blog as they are still getting their website set up. They’ve recently tweeted 21 URLs where you can go to submit requests to have your information removed from the people search sites, and in some cases phone numbers too. The tweets are tagged with #eraseme and #privacy to make them easy to find as well.

There are over 60 sites they work with to help remove information from, and the list below is not exhaustive, but it is a complete list as far as they know of those sites allowing for web-based submissions for records removal requests.

Some sites only accept requests by mail, such as PeopleLookUp, US Search, & Zaba Search which can all be reached at the same address. Although, one site tells you that you can only fax in your request, another says you can only mail it, and one allows you to fax and/or mail it… ironically, they all share overlapping fax or mailing information. So one letter, to this address requesting removal from all three sites should help take care of this one. Be sure to check out their OptOut requirements as you have to send supporting documentation you’ll need this form too http://intelius.com/docs/notaryverificationform.pdf. Yes, that form is hosted on the Intelius domain.

Privacy Officer / Records Removals
P.O. Box 4145
Removal Bellevue WA 98009-4145

Here is the consolidated list of URLs that they tweeted out separately earlier this evening.

http://l.westuc.com/privacy/index.php
http://members.reversegenie.com/customer/help
http://www.addresses.com/optout.php
http://www.archives.com/?_act=Optout
http://www.ebureau.com/privacy-center/opt-out
http://www.peekyou.com/about/contact/optout/index.php
http://www.peoplefinder.com/optout.php
http://www.reversephonelookup.com/remove.php
http://www.spokeo.com/opt_out/new
http://www.zoominfo.com/lookupEmail
https://support.whitepages.com/hc/en-us/articles/203263794-How-do-I-remove-my-people-search-profile-
https://thatsthem.com/optout
https://www.beenverified.com/f/optout/search
https://www.instantcheckmate.com/optout/
https://www.intelius.com/optout
https://www.peoplelookup.com/privacy.php
https://www.peoplesmart.com/optout-go
https://www.phonedetective.com/PD.aspx?_act=OptOut
https://www.searchbug.com/comments.aspx?WHAT=people
https://www.usa-people-search.com/manage/
https://www.yellowpagesoptout.com/

Be sure to follow their twitter account for helpful nuggets on deleting your personal information and reducing your digital footprint.

What’s Under that Threshold?

This blog post is meant to be short, sweet and to the point so please forgive the brevity if you were looking for something in depth this time….

*THE LITTLE FISH*

Many of us are trained to get the big fish, find the next cutting edge threat, defend against the big blob of red in the graphic of some ridiculous C-level slide presentation. We sit, eyes locked on some SOC tool waiting for bells & whistles to go off, the emails to start flying, the lights to flash to wake us up because we’ve fallen asleep from boredom all because we’ve place our trust in a tool to tell us on what we should focus our attention. So, how often do you go digging, or lift up the lid on something peeking to see what’s inside? What are you doing about the quiet, smart bad guy who’s tiptoeing in just under your alert criteria? You know, the one who isn’t making a lot of noise on your network, the customer doing the dirtiest of deeds, just under your thresholds for your automated alarms?

*MY GLORIOUS TOOLS*

Well, if you know what your thresholds are for automated alerts, why aren’t YOU looking at what lies beneath it? Is it because you think nobody with malicious intent would take the time to do X in such small quantities because it wouldn’t pay off? Is it because your tool is awesome and perfect *cough*cough*cough*cries*grabs water*? If you answered yes, to the 2nd or 3rd question please allow me to share some good ol’ country advice that has served me well is “He who underestimates his enemy, has lost the first battle in the war.”

*MY CUSTOMER?! NOT _MY_ CUSTOMER*

So without divulging the details to my current research, I’ll share a few things I’ve been noticing lately. First is bad guys doing a little here, a little there regarding purchasing domains. Instead of buying in bulk, they’re buying a few each day at a time. So, if you’re selling domains, maybe you want to take a look at any customers who are buying in quantities just below your “alarm” threshold and who are NOT buying via your bulk discount programs. I mean seriously, what does one individual need with a couple hundred domains, that he/she wouldn’t want to take advantage of bulk discounts? I mean, they could just be a legit business that doesn’t know any better, but I’m gonna guess not. It might be worth checking those domains out using tools such as OpenDNS, Domain Tools, Threat Grid, and Virus Total. Are the domains registered, more than 30 days old and still do not have a websites? What’s the aggregate amount of domains purchased in the last 30 days and how old is the customer account? Does the data on the domain registrations, match that on your customer’s account? Does the data on the domain registration match ANOTHER customer account? If you find that your customer’s domains are popping hot, ya just might want to take a leeeetle-bit closer look at their activities.

Let’s look at another OSINT source you have….customer access logs. The second thing I’ve been noticing is bad guys creating DNS entries a little here, a little there. So you found a guy, flying below the radar (could be a girl, but just go with me here) with the daily number of domains being purchased under your alarm level. Maybe you provide infrastructure not domains, so you offer DNS, and you have a customer flying below the radar making lots of DNS records. Do your tools alert you when a customer logs into his/her account from multiple ASN’s or ASN’s in different countries? I mean if a guy logs in for <5 minutes, makes DNS records, and logs out all from from Romania on Sunday, Russia on Monday, Great Britain on Tues....etc either he's racking up some serious frequent flyer miles or he might be up to no good. AGAIN, there COULD be a perfectly legitimate explanation (none come to mind immediately) but you won't even know unless you go looking. If you're providing website hosting, do you have a customer that has hundreds of completely unrelated domains pointing to a single IP? I once found a guy with over 900 malicious domains all pointing/pointed to a single IP...I wanted to say to the provider "Seriously you don't notice?" *SUMMARY* So the point of today's topic - start looking BELOW your automated thresholds for the really bad guys. Be pro-active, stop waiting for bad guys to wave, shake your hand, and say hello. Thanks again for taking time to read the blog and feel free to share comments, DM me on twitter, or just tag and say hi!

Stop Having Sex for the First Time – part 2

In the first part of this article, I gave some various examples of how InfoSec teams are structured to fail or at the very least function very inefficiently. Next we’ll talk about how to achieve a more effective *INTEL* team – and how it will enable the development of intelligence in the organization.

FIRST: Specialization Without Division –
So, here’s where experience in the bedroom really pans out in this InfoSecsy relationship. You want to get lots of smart people who each excel at one thing but know a little bit about a lot of related things.

Both InfoSec & Intel teams will benefit from this structure, the caveat is that you must also have people with the right personality (nobody likes selfishness in the sheets). In addition to the right mix of talent, you need people that respect each other’s abilities, aren’t afraid to ask for help and will be willing and even eager to share what they find. You don’t need a bunch of multipurpose rock stars, rather you want people who excel at things such as malware reverse engineering, pcap analysis, social engineering, development, data analysis, and even specific application software etc. You also want them to have foundation knowledge in other security realms.

The second part to this is that they are ONE TEAM, they are not divided into divisions with Directors and VPs over specific areas rather they are outside hires or even the internal elite from the network security team, the security operations center, the devops team etc. They will likely have liasion relationships with these functional areas and access to the data from them as well.

In some cases it may make sense to have multiple teams located together across the country, in some cases the company size may support having them co-locate in one physical space, nonetheless the bottom line is that they are all ONE Team. They are your version of a special forces troop, everyone has a job yet they all help each other and are willing to learn what they can about another area to be as effective and helpful as possible when needed.
SECOND: In Failure and Success, in Sickness and in Health ’til Termination Do We Part

This is an InfoSecsy partnership whether you like it or not. If an attack on your organization succeeds or fails, you share the responsibility. If you build something, and it doesn’t work, you share the failure and when it does, you share the success. If you have an idea and it leads nowhere, you mark it off as something tried and eliminated. If you have an idea, try it, if it fails tell everyone WHY/HOW it failed so they don’t waste resources trying the same thing, then move on. If you try something and it succeeds, share so everyone knows WHY/HOW it worked and they can repeat, enhance, and also succeed. [Ask @Ben0xA for his preso on FIAL – it’s awesome]
THIRD: share, Share, SHare, SHAre, SHARe, SHARE, SHARE!!!!!

Sharing InfoSecsy knowledge, skills, experience and ideas is only going to enhance your Intel team and company’s security posture. For example, the other day I had someone tell me that an Exchange team was unable to help us identify who clicked on a link while accessing OWA on a machine because everyone shared a generic login on the shared workstation. Having similar experience in a related area, I was able to offer a suggestion to the Exchange Team and the SOC Analyst that allowed the proper syslogs to be identified in their repository and the Exchange Team to liason with the Windows IIS team to pull the data that was later analyzed. Neither of these areas was my responsibility or expertise, but due to their willingness to share the problem and brainstorm, solutions emerged.
Another example, When we had a host that was unable to be found, I got the NOC, SOC and Help Desk all talking and we collectively came up with a non-traditional way to protect the network and find the asset. While I didn’t know the topology I was able to ask questions that spawned conversations that resulted in solutions.

Sometimes the person with the LEAST knowledge in a subject area can ask the simplest question that will light a much needed fire when because of how they processed the information. The bottom line is – get your people together regularly to discuss what has/is happened, known, and is yet to be figured out, and collectively, ideas and solutions will emerge.
FINALLY: Recycle & Re-Use

For this final note, I’ll use a hypothetical incident as an example. A Sales Engineer (SE) gets an email from an individual purportedly representing one if his clients. The individual is asking for assistance in collecting network and netflow data to help him tune his SIEM, a seemingly harmless request. As the conversation progresses the SE thinks the guy is sketchy so he contacts the SOC. The SOC runs a number of checks on the accounts and checks for any relationship to any known incidents, nothing is found. Guidance given is to limit the scope of information given to the individual per the company guidelines. So what’s next? Well, if we abide by the 3rd rule, this information would get shared with the Intel team, and then the 4th rule takes effect, the information is recycled. It is sent through the Intel Team that runs through it with a different filter and they begin to identify that not only is the individual sketchy, he is possibly even an imposter executing a very crafty social engineering attack. So what’s next? Recycle & Re-Use again. Contact the customer that the individual claims to represent and pass the information to them. Let them look at it with a different filter. You never know what puzzle someone else is putting together and what appears to be “nothing to see here” might be a critical piece of information that ties everything together for someone else.

SUMMARY:
The first part of this article discussed how traditional, rigid, corporate sandboxes of responsibility that define various IT functionalities within an InfoSec program have a tendency to do hinder effectiveness when it comes to security. The second part of this article provides some ideas and examples on how to restructure and build teams as well as ideas on when/how share information across specialities. There are a few takeaways I’d like to leave you with:

1. The only right structure, is the one that maximizes and encourages information sharing and meets the organizational needs for security AND intelligence within resource constraints

2. Embrace failures – they are the stepping stones that lead to the door of success

3. Bring your teams (worker bee level) from all disciplines, together regularly to discuss all kinds of security concerns and issues everyone is experiencing – and most of all encourage them to SHARE ideas and experience.

4. Recycle data on security incidents, even concerns of a possible incident. Ensure they are passed amongst your teams via a process that works for your organization, with the end goal of everyone getting a say-so/review of it.

So go forth, do great things, and enjoy the InfoSecsy side of security not just the InfoFail side.

Thank you once again for taking time to read OSINT Heaven’s Blog.

Shodan – A Boogeyman’s BFF

If you’ve ever heard me talk on OSINT one of the points I drive home is one I learned early from a colleague, Ian Amit (@iiamit) that if what you present doesn’t cause a change in behavior, it isn’t threat intel, it is intel/information.  Here’s a story on how I used OSINT techniques on my own organization in multiple ways, to cause a change in behavior.

Once upon a time in a land far far far away….there were device administrators that secured their devices properly….

/me wakes up disappointed

During my governance, risk and compliance days, before OSINT was a buzz word in the industry, one of the things organizations wanted to know (without hiring/contracting a pen-tester) was how vulnerable they were to “hackers” [I use that word sparingly as it has a very evil connotation to the ignorant masses].   Knowing they just asked me to boil the ocean, I worked to get them to narrow it down, and identify three things:

  1.  WHAT are you worried about being attacked (i.e. specific assets)

And let me be the first to say that if the org doesn’t have a decent Asset and Data Classification Policy that’s actually implemented HA! sucks to be you.

2.  WHICH attack vectors concern you the most

3.  HOW do you want me to answer you (reporting format)

So after getting those nailed down,  I decided to finally put all the hours of education to good use so I felt less guilty about spending all that money getting a degree just to get past the HR gremlins that eat resumes.

We didn’t exactly have a threat model, and being in the “Risk Department”  (pfft!) they weren’t going to listen to me tell them they needed one.  [BTW Risk Analysis != Threat Modeling] Nonetheless, I realized the scope of concern they had included threats to network assets [as opposed to software, people, places etc].  Thus I went forth to identify vulnerabilities that c/would be exploited, and immediately went to a wonderful sight called Shodan 

screen capture from https://www.shodan.io/explore/popular
Shodan most popular searches

that will tell you all kind of “wonderful” things about an organization’s threat vectors.  Leveraging a little knowledge of SQL and URL hacking I began running queries to check for some basic vulnerabilities that were not only available for my own perusal, but they were equally available for every other evil derp that didn’t like “us”.    I proceeded to exclaim rather loudly in the office “Are you Fuc41n6 Kidding ME?!” as I saw the results pour in.  So – now I knew it was not just bad…it was like Satan just gave a free pass on the bullet train straight to hell and you could hear him laughing like it was a carnival ride.

I hung my head in dismay, thinking – how am I going to communicate to “Management” just how bad this is?  Afterall they get vulnerability scans quarterly, monthly, weekly and in some cases daily – and they STILL don’t think the problem is “that bad.”  Technically, the Shodan results are nothing more than another data set reflecting vulnerabilities.

Then I remembered some very wise words

The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting -Sun Tzu

So I put together an initial OSINT report of generic threat actor profiles that would like (and probably already were) exploiting that exposed via Shodan, but I didn’t send it. Instead, first I took what I learned in Shodan and I created a “How to Sho-Dan” (pun on a C-levles name)  slide deck.  I mean, nobody is ever going to believe my report, I’ll be lucky if 1/3rd of them click on a single link and even luckier if 1/10th of them even understand what they’re reading/clicking on.

Then, I OSINT’d (ummm yeah that’s a word now just roll with me here) so I OSINT’d my fellow employees.  I read their social media profiles, eavesdropped at the water cooler, socially engineered (SE’d) them over coffee to figure out what were 1) their favorite & most hated places for work-hosted events 2) their favorite conference room 3) their idea of “fun” learning at work was.  Then I SE’d my boss into spending money, used his corporate credit card (with his approval), and set up a Lunch & Learn for non-security IT people including devs, netops team, help desk etc.  With food & drink in hand, and a promise of a prize for anyone who could tell me what the query revealed we began learning How To Sho-Dan.

EUREKA!

When it was all over they realized some very critical things:

  1. NONE of them had to even create an account to run a query…wut?! this is Open Source?!
  2. They didn’t have to know SQL or URL hacking, they only had to know key words and use the search boxes
  3. If they did have an account, they could get even more comprehensive reports

THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT LESSON:  If they could do it – so could bad guys, and there were definitely some serious boogeymen in the world.

IN THE END

I had successfully moved from data to information to intel to threat intel because the Lunch & Learn, combined with the OSINT report I provided caused a change in behavior, otherwise it was just intel and more vulnerability data.

I sent the OSINT report to the managers that had signed up for (even those that didn’t attend) the Lunch & Learn, and now with them empowered with context and a better understanding of the threat vectors,  I watched change explode.

  1. The vulnerability remediation tickets started getting a lot more love by all departments.
  2. The network team implemented changes to their firewall approval process, patching firmware, and network architecture.
  3. The developers began reconsidering what ports they really needed
  4. The server team modified their provisioning process to include a security review/approval milestone that was a show stopper.
  5. I even convinced C-levels to plan for an internal pen-testing team.

TAKEAWAYS:

  1. If minimally tech savvy people can do/google/youtube it then so can the bad guys
  2. OSINT on your own team is not evil 🙂
  3. Sometimes an OSINT report is far less valuable than an OSINT hands-on

 

BONUS
If you want to see a very hilarious and scary presentation go watch my colleague Dan Tentler’s (@Viss) talk from #DEFCON2015 as he exposes ridiculously huge #Fail of things accessible via the Internet.

Below are a list of the (sterilized) Shodan Queries that I used during the training and to generate a report on an OSINT tool that could/was being leveraged by threat actors targeting the organization.

  1. Hosts found w/ banner details stating “230 – Any Password will work”
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=-421+-fe_sendauth+-invalid+-401+-530+%22password%22+org%3A%22Company_Name%22+%22230+Any%22
  2. Hosts found with banner stating “Use ‘passwd’ to set your login password this will disable telnet and enable SSH”
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=-421+-fe_sendauth+-invalid+-401+-530+%22password%22+org%3A%22Company_Name%22+%22passwd%22
  3. Hosts found with banner stating “230 Anonymous access granted, restrictions apply”
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=”230+Anonymous”+”root”+org%3A”Company_Name”
  4. FTP Servers reflected as allowing Anonymous access
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=-534+-530+port%3A21+org%3A%22Company_Name%22
  5. Anything Company_Name
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=org%3A”Company_Name”
  6. Company_Name & Default Passwords
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=%22default+password%22+org%3A%22Company_Name%22
  7. Company_Name, Password
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=-530+%22password%22+org%3A%22Company_Name%22
  8. Company_Name and OpenSSH Ports
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=openssh+port%3A22+org%3A%22Company_Name%22
  9. Company_Name and Splunk on port 8089
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=port%3A8089+splunkd+org%3A%22Company_Name%22
  10. Company_Name, MySQL on port 3306
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=port%3A3306+org%3A%22Company_Name%22+product%3A%22MySQL%22
  11. Company_Name, “200 OK”, “Set-Cookie expires 2016”
    https://www.shodan.io/search?query=%22Set-Cookie+expires+2016%22+%22200+OK%22+org%3A%22Company_Name%22

For use with the Search Box if you don’t like the URLs

  • city:”$city”
  • country:$country
  • geo:$lat,$lon
  • os:$operatingSystem
  • net:$ipRange/$cidr
  • org:”$OrgName”
  • product:”$product name in here”
  • isp:”$ISP Name Here”
  • asn:”AS######”
  • devicetype:”firewall”
  • ports:80, 443

Words Matter

One of the single most important techniques/activities when gathering intelligence (i.e. intel) from open source repositories is analytic reading. The second is properly presenting data/intel with relevant context.

ANALYTIC READING

This isn’t the kind of reading you do in the summer with a children’s book and litter of rug rats gathered at your feet, this is the kind of reading one does where you look for hints or clues about a person based on phrasing or word choice. Now you don’t need to have a degree in psychology or grammar to do this, you simply have to pay attention, take notes, and apply a little common sense.

Let’s take my request for help from the #InfoSecFam on ideas for my first blog. Here were the responses I got (thank you to the brave souls who dare support me) :p

  1. Well, you could start with those lovely examples of people posting pics of credit cards…
  2. Then folks posting about going on vacation on their facebooks…
  3. Maybe some military types posting pics with intact exif?
  4. <graphic> #internetfeds
  5. google hacking is still incredibly viable, and it’s a huge OSINT fail.
  6. specifically anonymous FTP servers indexed by google.
  7. <graphic> bad admins everywhere. Really bad. Ive seen some sh1t man
  8. Boarding passes are now a big thing… “I Know Where You LIve: all the sh*t that people post”
  9. You could do reviews of OSINT web-tools
  10. ok, an oldie being forgotten, ‘don’t run with admin/root’.

Just a Little Intel…

So, let’s analyze what we’ve read. [Note this example is very trivial, however the principles presented are not.]

  • Q1: What’s the culture/industry of the authors here?
    • A1: #InfoSec
  • Q2: What are underlying characteristics of this group’s communication styles?
    • A2:  InfoSec culture is heavily sarcastic
  • Q3:  Are there clues to anyone’s profession/hobby listed in these comments?
    • A3:  Yes – acronym and word choice: FTP, intact exif, bad admins everywhere, ‘admin/root’
  • Q4:  Any clues to age or experience?
    • A4: Yes –  still incredibly viable, oldie but goodieI

The list of questions above is a trivial example of how to glean the not-so-obvious intel that is implied.  Nonetheless, the questions asked and answered, should be driven by a few things, two at minimum: a profile template and a threat model [otherwise you’re out there going all Willy Nilly and traipsing through minefields of soggy cow patties.]  SO! Before you even start gathering Intel, your leadership should have identified WHAT they want to know (identified in the threat model) and HOW you will collect it (defined in the documentation standards and profile template).  So as you do answer these very valuable questions, you’re looking for the same data points, all the time, essentially filling in the pieces of a puzzle one at a time.  Keep in mind, they may not all be present, but at least you’re looking for them.  As you get them, you should be capturing them in a profile template.

The list of questions could go on and on depending on how much of the ocean you’re planning on boiling, and tools such as the IBM Tone Analyzer (demo link here) or the IBM Personality Analyzer can offer valuable insight as well, but tools are no replacement for instinct.  While these tools may enhance or even expedite the analysis process, they cannot replace an Analyst’s instinct and skills of discernment as they read something and decide what “box” to put it in, if it is relevant, indicates personality traits, warrants in/exclusion or is a thread that needs to be pulled to see what else unravels.

Takeaway:  Read closely, carefully, and never under estimate the human factors at work.  Read between the letters AND the lines.  You may find clues you need when building a profile or finding a target simply by the nuances in their tiniest commentary.

RELEVANT CONTEXT

So let’s talk about the biggest mistake with the list…. It’s in numerical order! If you were only reading this an OSINT report, you might think these came from 10 different people or one person provided 10 ideas. So, by creating a pure LIST of comments rather than a LIST with logical grouping, we lose context because multiple comments were made by some of the same individuals,

Let’s fix that….

P1-1. Well, you could start with those lovely examples of people posting pics of credit cards…
P1-2. Then folks posting about going on vacation on their facebooks…
P1-3. Maybe some military types posting pics with intact exif?

P2-1. <graphic of chat> #internetfeds
P2-2. <graphic of man hiding in a chair> bad admins everywhere. Really bad. Ive seen some sh1t man (BTW @MyTinehNimjeh I <3 u man LOL)

P3-1. google hacking is still incredibly viable, and it’s a huge OSINT fail.
P3-2. specifically anonymous FTP servers indexed by google.

P4-1. Boarding passes are now a big thing… “I Know Where You LIve: all the sh*t that people post”
P5-1. You could do reviews of OSINT web-tools
P6-1. ok, an oldie being forgotten, ‘don’t run with admin/root’.

Now you see there were actually 6, not 10 people who replied (P# meaning Person 1, Person 2, Person 3…-1, -2 being the comment number they made).

Additionally, this context represents something else taken for granted by the statisticians an API monkeys – it isn’t always the total volume that matters, sometimes it’s the volume of one person, or even the lack of replies to others who may have forked a conversation thread.  If this thread were listed as a statistic, stating that there were 10 comments, that too would also be incorrect.  There were actually a few different forks, some took a humorous path, others were simply “neutral” suggestions, AND there were more than a total of 10 interactions.  This list however, only represented those comments that were actually relevant to the request for help with ideas which were extracted and placed in this article.  Again, in your OSINT reports, ensure you represent relevant intel accurately, and provide the reader proper context through commentary and presentation.

Takeaway – ensure that HOW you present data in a report represents it with as much relevant context as possible.